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I. INTRODUCTION  
In 2014 and 2015, the public’s attention was repeatedly drawn to 
highly-publicized incidents in which unarmed African Americans were 
killed or injured by police officers who used force under circumstances 
that generated strong debates about the officers’ methods and 
justifications.1  A 12-year-old boy in Cleveland was shot to death by 
police while playing on a playground with a toy gun.2  Elsewhere in 
Ohio, a young man was shot to death by police inside a Wal-Mart store 
after he picked up a pellet gun from a shelf and headed toward the 
                                                                                                             
 *  Professor of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University.  A.B., Harvard University, 
1980; M.Sc., University of Bristol (U.K.), 1981; J.D., University of Tennessee, 1984; 
Ph.D., University of Connecticut, 1988. 
1 See, e.g., Michael Wines & Sarah Cohen, Police Killings Rise Slightly, Though 
Increased Focus May Suggest Otherwise, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2015), 
http://nyti.ms/1Q3aFD9. 
2 See Elahe Izadi & Peter Holley, Video Shows Cleveland Officer Shooting 12-Year-
Old Tamir Rice within Seconds, WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/11/26/officials-release-video 
-names-in-fatal-police-shooting-of-12-year-old-cleveland-boy/. 
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cashier’s station with the apparent intention of purchasing the item.3  A 
New York City man suspected of illegally selling unpackaged cigarettes 
died when wrestled to the ground by an officer using a chokehold.4  A 
police officer in South Carolina fired eight times at the back of an 
unarmed man fleeing on foot after a traffic stop and falsely claimed that 
he feared for his life because the man had seized the officer’s Taser and 
was going to use it on the officer.5  The killing likely would have been 
ruled a justifiable homicide based on the officer’s claims except that, 
unbeknownst to the officer, his actions were being filmed by a witness 
with a cellphone.6  A student leader at the University of Virginia bled 
profusely from his face when pushed roughly to the ground by alcohol 
control officers.7  Less well-known cases throughout the country became 
matters of intense local concern.8  These publicized events came on the 
heels of years of controversy and in New York City, culminated in the 
filing of a federal lawsuit over the police department’s practice of 
making thousands of stops and searches of young minority men without 
a proper legal basis.9 
The incident that generated the most national attention, as well as 
countless protest marches in cities throughout country,10 was the 
                                                                                                             
3 See Elahe Izadi, Ohio Wal-Mart Surveillance Video Shows Police Shooting and 
Killing John Crawford III, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com 
/news/post-nation/wp/2014/09/25/ohio-wal-mart-surveillance-video-shows-police-
shooting-and-killing-john-crawford-iii/. 
4 See Marc Santora, Eric Garner’s Family to Sue New York City Over Chokehold 
Case, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/08/nyregion/eric-
garners-family-to-sue-new-york-city-over-chokehold-case.html. 
5 See Michael S. Schmidt & Matt Apuzzo, South Carolina Officer Is Charged With 
Murder of Walter Scott, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1yTohXD. 
6 See id. 
7 See Gary Robertson, Bloody Arrest of Black Virginia Student Spurs Second Day of 
Protests, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2015/03/20/us/ 
20reuters-usa-police-virginia.html. 
8 See, e.g., L.L. Brasier, Video Shows Police Beating During Traffic Stop, DETROIT 
FREE PRESS (Mar 25, 2015), http://on.freep.com/1buk47C; Richard Fausset, Police 
Shooting Victim in Georgia Tried to Follow ‘Sensible’ Path, N.Y. TIMES (Mar 24, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/25/us/atlanta-police-shooting-victim-tried-to-live-a-
life-that-mattered.html; J. David Goodman and Vivian Yee, Officer Charged in Akai 
Gurley Case Debated Reporting Gunshot, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES (Feb 11, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/12/nyregion/akai-gurley-shooting-death-
arraignment.html. 
9 See Benjamin Weiser and Joseph Goldstein, Mayor Says New York City Will Settle 
Suits on Stop-and-Frisk Tactics, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/31/nyregion/de-blasio-stop-and-frisk.html. 
10 See generally Emily Brown, Timeline: Michael Brown Shooting in Ferguson, MO, 
USA TODAY (Aug. 10, 2015), http://usat.ly/VpsbtG (detailing the timeline of events, 
starting with the shooting of Michael Brown). 
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shooting death of unarmed, teenager Michael Brown of Ferguson, 
Missouri, in August 2014, by Officer Darren Wilson, who avoided 
criminal charges for the incident.11  The unusual grand jury 
proceedings12 that led Officer Wilson to avoid criminal charges sparked 
protests, civil disorder, and property damage in Ferguson.13  The U.S. 
Department of Justice subsequently issued a scathing investigative report 
detailing policing and court practices in Ferguson that targeted less-
affluent African Americans with numerous citations, fines, and jailing 
fees as a means to generate revenue to fund city government.14  Thus, the 
controversy over the situation in Ferguson served to represent and 
embody widespread issues about race, policing, use of force, and 
discrimination in the justice system.15 
The policing and court system issues raised by the events in 
Ferguson and comparable incidents throughout the nation are considered 
local matters albeit widespread and existing locally in cities and counties 
throughout the country16 due to fragmentation in the American justice 
system17 caused by federalism issues.18  Federal authorities responded in 
                                                                                                             
11 See William Freivogel, What’s Different About the Grand Jury in the Darren Wilson 
Process?, ST. LOUIS PUBLIC RADIO (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.tinyurl.com/ololwm6. 
(The unusual aspects of the grand jury proceedings included the lack of specific charges 
pursued by the prosecutor, the large amounts of information indiscriminately presented 
without prosecutorial guidance, and the presentation of witnesses that the prosecutor 
knew to be lying.) See, e.g., Peter Holley, Ferguson Prosecutor Says He Knew Some 
Witnesses Were ‘Clearly Not Telling the Truth.’ They Testified Anyway, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 20, 2014), http://wapo.st/1wXOHIQ; Jeffrey Toobin, How Not to Use a Grand 
Jury, THE NEW YORKER (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-
desk/use-grand-jury. 
12 Id. See also Stephanie Francis Ward, Public Was Misled About Ferguson Grand 
Jury Proceedings, According to Federal Complaint, A.B.A.J. (January 5, 2015), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/public_misled_about_ferguson_grand_jury_proc
eedings_according_to_federal_co. 
13 See Aamer Madhani, Protests Ease as Snow Falls on Ferguson, USA TODAY (Nov. 
27, 2014), http://usat.ly/1zXRD8T. See also David McCormack, Protests Break Out 
Across NINETY Cities as Thousands March in Anger, DAILY MAIL (Nov. 24, 2014), 
http://dailym.ai/lvj8zq8. 
14 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE 
FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 9–15 (Mar. 4, 2015), 
http://www.justice.gove/sites/default 
/files/opa/pressreleases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report_1. 
pdf. 
15 Tierney Sneed, Ferguson’s Problems Are Not Ferguson’s Alone, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP. (Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/08/22/ 
fergusons-racial-problems-are-not-unique-to-ferguson. 
16 Id. 
17 See, e.g., GEORGE F. COLE, ET AL., THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 97 
(14th ed. 2015) (“Because both state and federal systems operate in the United States, 
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limited ways to push toward reform through such means as President 
Obama’s appointment of a national task force to quickly study problems 
and make recommendations for police reform.19  The Director of the FBI 
spoke publicly about problems with racial discrimination in policing.20  
In addition, the U.S. Department of Justice conducted an investigation of 
Ferguson, just as it had done with other cities whose police departments 
sparked concerns about improper use of force by officers.21 
The federal judiciary, by contrast, cannot similarly respond in 
proactive fashion because of the need to wait for legal cases to be 
developed, presented, and work their way through the court system for 
judges’ decisions about specific legal issues.22  Yet, this is not to say that 
the judicial branch lacks involvement in the contemporary controversies 
about race, policing, and use of force.23  Indeed, decisions by the U.S. 
Supreme Court helped to shape and even facilitate the practices that gave 
rise to these highly-publicized, tragic incidents.24  Thus, this article will 
examine the Supreme Court’s role, by commission and omission, in 
generating the current historical moment of controversy and conflict. 
                                                                                                             
criminal justice here is highly decentralized . . . .[A]lmost two-thirds of all criminal 
justice employees work for local governments.”). 
18 See id. (“The majority of workers in all subunits of the [justice] system—except 
corrections—are tied to local government . . . .As a result, local traditions, values, and 
practices shape the way criminal justice agencies operate.”). 
19 See Exec. Order No. 13,684, 79 Fed. Reg. 76,865. (Dec. 18, 2014). 
20 Nia-Malika Henderson, FBI Director Comey Gave a Bold Speech on Race and 
Police. Now What?, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2015/02/12/fbi-director-james-comey-
gave-a-bold-speech-on-race-and-police-now-what/. 
21 See Matt Appuzo & Manny Fernandez, Federal Inquiry of Ferguson Police Will 
Include Apparent Racial Profiling, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/05/us/racial-profiling-by-ferguson-police-to-be-part-of-
federal-inquiry.html?_r=0 (“Broad Justice Department investigations like the one Mr. 
Holder announced on Thursday can lead to voluntary policy changes or agreements that 
give the federal government oversight over a police department. Before Ferguson, there 
have been 20 such broad investigations under Holder.”). 
22 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, COURTS AND PUBLIC POLICY 41 (Nelson-Hall Pub. 
eds., 1993) (“The policy agendas of judges are determined by the cases initiated in court 
and judges do not have the same ability as other governmental officials to . . . consciously 
pursu[e] favored policy issues.”). 
23 See e.g, Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding 
that the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk practices disproportionately targeted young minority 
males without a proper legal basis, and ordering immediate reforms to end the 
constitutional violations). 
24 See generally, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (broadening the ability 
of police to conduct investigative stops, diluting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). 
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II. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND GUIDELINES FOR 
POLICE PRACTICES 
For much of American history, police officers were often 
unprofessional bullies acting on behalf of the local political regime rather 
than civil servants trained to carry out important functions for public 
safety.25  As described by policing historian Samuel Walker, police 
officers were patronage appointees of mayors and other political leaders 
who “enforced the narrow prejudices of their constituencies, harassing 
‘undesirables’ or discouraging any kind of ‘unwelcome’ behavior.”26  
However, in the mid-twentieth century, several influences pushed 
American police departments to professionalize and reform, including 
changing public expectations,27 police executives’ growing interest in 
effective policing,28 and later, the threat of lawsuits for improper use of 
force and other rights violations by police.29  One additional factor had a 
significant impact on the professionalization of police policies and 
practices: U.S. Supreme Court decisions defining constitutional rights 
that simultaneously told law enforcement officers what they could and 
could not do.30  Many of the police-behavior limiting decisions were 
produced during the Warren Court era of the 1960s31 by Supreme Court 
justices who came into adulthood carrying personal memories and 
experiences from encounters with the abusive behavior of pre-1940s 
police.32  The Supreme Court’s composition changed significantly 
beginning with President Richard Nixon’s election in 196833 and 
                                                                                                             
25 See SAMUEL WALKER, A CRITICAL HISTORY OF POLICE REFORM 133 (1977) 
(“Brutality and uncivil conduct had long been part of the American police tradition.”). 
26 SAMUEL WALKER, “Broken Windows” and Fractured History: The Use and Misuse 
of History in Recent Police Patrol Analysis, 1 JUST Q. 75, 84 (1984). 
27 See id. at 80–83. 
28 COLE, ET AL., supra note 17, at 182–83. 
29 CHARLES R. EPP, MAKING RIGHTS REAL: ACTIVISTS, BUREAUCRATS, AND THE 
CREATION OF THE LEGALISTIC STATE 72–77 (2009). 
30 Christopher E. Smith, Police Professionalism and the Rights of Criminal 
Defendants, 26 CRIM. L. BULL. 155, 157–158 (1990). 
31 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (establishing a bright-line 
exclusionary rule for evidence obtained through improper searches); Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436, 492 (1966) (holding that police officers are obligated to inform suspects of 
constitutional rights prior to custodial questioning); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) 
(requiring that specific factual circumstances must exist in order for police officers to 
conduct stop and frisk searches). 
32 CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, THE REHNQUIST COURT AND CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT 34–36 
(1997). 
33 See CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 119 (2003) (“When Richard 
Nixon ran for president of the United States in 1968, he made law and order a central 
campaign issue, in part, by accusing the Supreme Court and other federal judges of being 
too soft on crime.”). 
58 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:53 
 
continuing for the next quarter century in which only Republican 
presidents34 had the opportunity to appoint new justices to the nation’s 
highest court.35 A primary consequence of the Court’s altered 
composition was that “decisions on criminal justice, abortion, and other 
issues changed significantly between the early 1970s and the early 
1990s.”36  With respect to criminal justice, the Republican presidents37 
who appointed Supreme Court justices and other federal judges during 
this era sought to emulate Nixon’s effort to “appoint new judges who 
would alter the balance between protection of rights and crime control by 
giving greater emphasis to the empowerment of law enforcement 
officers.”38  The majority opinions produced by the Supreme Court’s 
new, more-conservative orientation led observers to view criminal justice 
decisions, in particular, as the area in which these presidents enjoyed 
success in triggering the alteration of constitutional law.39  As subsequent 
sections of this article will explain, this diminution and dilution of rights 
affecting criminal justice,40 along with the attendant expansion in police 
                                                                                                             
34 See THOMAS R. HENSLEY ET AL., THE CHANGING SUPREME COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 35 (1997) (“Presidents Nixon, Reagan, and Bush used their 
appointments to select justices whom they hoped would slow or reverse the liberal civil 
rights and liberties decisions of the earlier Warren Court era.”). 
35 See LINDA GREENHOUSE, THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 
32 (2012) (“[N]o Democratic president made a Supreme Court nomination from 1967 
until 1993 . . . .”). 
36 HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 34. 
37 See, e.g., HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF 
APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 334 (2d ed. 1985) (“[President Reagan] insisted 
that his nominee meet his political ideological criteria. Thus the Reagan team had 
searched for a woman with demonstrable conservative political and judicial views.”); 
CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH & JOYCE A. BAUGH, THE REAL CLARENCE THOMAS: 
CONFIRMATION VERACITY MEETS PERFORMANCE REALITY 19 (2000) (“In sum, Bush 
wanted to nominate a politically conservative African American to the Supreme 
Court . . . .[Clarence Thomas] received strong support from conservative interest groups 
that Bush sought to please . . . .”). 
38 SMITH, supra note 33. 
39 See, e.g., CHARLES M. LAMB & STEPHEN C. HALPERN, THE BURGER COURT AND 
BEYOND, IN THE BURGER COURT: POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL PROFILES 434 (Charles M. 
Lamb & Stephen C. Halpern ed. 1991) (“[T]he Burger Court significantly chipped away 
at Warren Court precedents in such constitutional areas as criminal procedure . . . .”); JAN 
CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR 
CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 29 (2007) (“During [William] 
Rehnquist’s remarkable thirty-three year judicial career, he eventually molded other 
justices to his strong law enforcement views.”). 
40 See, e.g., WELSH S. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS: POLICE 
INTERROGATION PRACTICES AFTER DICKERSON 4 (2003) (“[T]he Warren Court interpreted 
the due process test so as to expand protections afforded suspects subjected to police 
interrogation, [but] the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have interpreted Miranda so as to 
diminish suspects’ protections.”). 
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officers’ authority and discretionary actions,41 helped to create the 
environment that produced post-Ferguson controversies about 
contemporary policing.42 
From a rights-protective perspective, we have seen a downward slide 
over time from the specific requirements of Warren Court decisions, 
such as Terry v. Ohio43 and Miranda v. Arizona.44  In the contemporary 
era, research studies and news stories remind us that police often adapt 
their behavior to avoid legal requirements created by the Supreme 
Court45 or, unfortunately, act with impunity in clear violation of the law 
and with the apparent belief that they will not be caught and held 
accountable.46  The Supreme Court’s role in this slide stems from 
numerous decisions that diluted the clarity and strength of the Warren 
Court’s decisions creating clear, strong rights-protective rules to guide 
police conduct.47  Consequently, the Supreme Court has abdicated, at 
least in part,48 its role for sending messages to the law enforcement 
community about the importance of rights, the constitutional requirement 
                                                                                                             
41 See, e.g., SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: MYTH & REALITIES 107 (2004) (“[T]he 
Supreme Court during the Burger Court (1969–1986) and Rehnquist Court (1986–[2005]) 
eras made many of the decisions that increased police officers’ opportunities to undertake 
and justify warrantless searches.”). 
42 See infra notes 62–180 and accompanying text. 
43 Compare Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (requiring specific facts and 
circumstances to justify a stop-and-frisk), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) 
(requiring specific warnings to detained suspects prior to custodial detentions), with infra 
notes 50–63 and accompanying text (analyzing Terry’s narrow ruling and its effect on 
police actions). 
44 In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Warren Court required specific 
warnings be given to detained suspects prior to custodial interrogations. See SMITH, supra 
note 32 at 213–20. 
45 RICHARD A LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICES 119–64 (2008). 
46 See, e.g., Jason Molinet, 10 San Bernardino County Deputies Suspended After Video 
Shows Beating of Suspect Who Fled on Horseback, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr, 10, 2015), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/california-deputies-investigation-brutal-
beating-article-1.2180308 (news helicopter filmed from overhead as numerous sheriff 
deputies hit and kicked a handcuffed arrested man after he led them on a chase through a 
mountainous wilderness area); David von Drehle, Line of Fire, TIME (Apr. 20, 2015), at 
24–31 (police officer in North Charleston, South Carolina, was unknowingly filmed by a 
bystander as he shot an unarmed, fleeing man in the back after a traffic stop). 
47 See infra notes 62–180 and accompanying text. 
48 The contemporary Supreme Court issues decisions that support rights in the context 
of criminal justice, but these rights-protective decisions are not as numerous as its 
decisions that reject suspects’ and defendants’ claims and thereby increase the flexibility 
and authority for decision making by police and prosecutors. See Madhavi M. McCall et 
al., Criminal Justice and the 2010–2011 U.S. Supreme Court Term, 53 S. TEX. L. REV. 
307, 312 (2011); Madhavi M. McCall et al., Criminal Justice and the 2008-2009 U.S. 
Supreme Court Term, 29 MISS. COLL. REV. 1, 4 (2010). 
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of individualized suspicion, and the threat of legal accountability for 
improper police conduct.49 
A. The Diminution of Individualized Suspicion for Police 
Stops 
The Warren Court addressed police officers’ legal authority to stop 
and frisk pedestrians in its seminal decision Terry v. Ohio in 1968.50  The 
decision was made by the Supreme Court at the height of its most liberal 
composition with respect to the relatively large number of justices who 
regularly supported suspects’ and defendants’ claims in two-thirds or 
more of criminal justice cases.51  It is instructive to revisit the Court’s 
holding in Terry because it defined very specific factual circumstances 
and officers’ reasonable conclusions from those circumstances that were 
needed in order to justify a stop-and-frisk.52  Chief Justice Warren’s 
majority opinion said the following: 
We merely hold today that where a police officer 
observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to 
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity 
may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is 
dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in 
the course of investigating this behavior he identifies 
himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, 
and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter 
serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others’ 
safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and 
others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of 
the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to 
discover weapons which might be used to assault him.53 
Within this holding there are very specific elements that officers 
must observe and use as the basis for reasonable conclusions about the 
suspect being armed and dangerous in order to justify a warrantless stop-
and-frisk search.54  Clearly, Chief Justice Warren’s opinion sought to 
                                                                                                             
49 The idea that the Supreme Court sends messages that instruct the public about 
values and democracy has been embodied in political science literature that characterizes 
the Supreme Court as a “republican schoolmaster.” Charles H. Franklin & Liane C. 
Kosaki, Republican Schoolmaster: The U.S. Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and 
Abortion, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 751, 751 (1989). 
50 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
51 SMITH, supra note 32, at 7. 
52 Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. 
53 Id. 
54 SMITH, supra note 33, at 154–55. 
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narrowly define and limit the circumstances in which individuals’ liberty 
and reasonable expectations of privacy could suffer intrusions based on 
police officers’ suspicions and desire to stop and frisk a pedestrian.55 
By contrast, if we fast forward to the second decade of the twenty-
first century, little may remain, in practice, of Chief Justice Warren’s 
specific, careful requirements for stops as, in New York City, for 
example, where litigation revealed that officers made stop-and-frisk 
searches based merely on marking a checklist box for “furtive 
movement.”56  In a lawsuit against New York City, officers testified that 
they used the “furtive movement” category to stop people who were 
merely “being fidgety, changing directions, walking in a certain way, 
grabbing at a pocket, or looking over one’s shoulder,”57 a far cry from 
the specific observations required by the Terry standard.58  New York’s 
practices resulted in stops of hundreds of thousands of pedestrians, most 
of whom were African American and Hispanic.59  The practice was 
driven by police administrators’ use of recorded stops as a quantitative 
performance measure for officers,60 a belief that such numerous stops 
deterred people from carrying firearms,61 and explicit instructions from 
supervisors for officers to target young minority men for investigation.62  
                                                                                                             
55 Id. 
56 Behind the Decision on the Stop-and-Frisk Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/08/12/nyregion/10-years-of-stop-and-
frisk.html?_r=0; GREG RIDGEWAY, ANALYSIS OF RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE NEW YORK 
POLICE DEPARTMENT’S STOP, QUESTION, AND FRISK PRACTICES 54 (2007). 
57 Joseph Goldstein, Judge Rejects New York’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/nyregion/stop-and-frisk-practice-
violated-rights-judge-rules.html. 
58 See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text. 
59 Joseph Goldstein & Wendy Ruderman, Street Stops in New York Fall as Unease 
Over Tactic Grows, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2012); Jennifer Gonnerman, Officer Serrano’s 
Hidden Camera; The Stop-and-Frisk Trials of Pedro Serrano: NYPD Rat, NYPD Hero, 
N.Y. MAG. (May 19, 2013), http://nymag.com/news/features/pedro-serrano-2013-5/. 
60 Joseph Goldstein, In Its Defense, Police Dept. Cites Laziness of Its Officers, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 30, 2013, at A15. 
61 Michael Cooper, The Diallo Shooting: The Stop-and-Frisk: Procedure Was Once to 
Protect the Police, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1999, at B3. 
62 See Gonnerman, supra note 59 (description of tape recorded meeting between 
Officer Serrano and his precinct commander, Deputy Inspector McCormack. Serrano 
tried to defend himself, but McCormack continued, “For the 4-12s in the 4-0, you know, I 
could see in Central Park maybe that would be fine, but this ain’t Central Park.” The 
longer the conversation continued, the more heated both men became. Serrano: “Mott 
Haven, full of blacks and Hispanics. Okay . . . So what am I supposed to do? Is it stop 
every black and Hispanic?” He repeated the question several times. McCormack: “This is 
about stopping the right people, the right place, the right location  . . . [t]ake Mott Haven, 
where we had the most problems. And the most problems we had there were robberies 
and grand larcenies.” Serrano: “And who are those people robbing?” McCormack: “The 
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The use of pretextual, racially-skewed investigative stops by police is not 
limited to pedestrian-focused New York City as it is also used in other 
locations where it is most evident in traffic stops and searches.63 
While the police abuses that gained public attention in 2014 and 
2015 are the product of law enforcement practices that self-consciously 
and aggressively investigate people deemed “suspicious” by police 
officials,64 decisions by the Supreme Court also contributed to officers’ 
greater sense of discretionary freedom that has contributed to improper 
conduct.  During the Burger Court era, in United States v. Mendenhall,65 
for example, police officers approached a woman at an airport, asked for 
identification, questioned her, and ultimately escorted her to a private 
area where a search of her clothing revealed that she was carrying illegal 
narcotics.66  Seven justices, including the four dissenters, treated her 
encounter with the police as a “seizure” according to the principles of 
Terry.67 However, a total of five justices concluded that she had 
consented to the search and therefore, no violation of rights occurred.68  
The decision effectively endorsed the notion of profiling suspects based 
on limited facts that fell well short of the required factual observations 
specified in Terry.69  The officers in Mendenhall approached the suspect 
based on a claim that she fit a “drug courier” profile,70 even though the 
four dissenters found her behavior to be lacking indicators of 
suspiciousness.71  The dissenters specifically referenced language from 
                                                                                                             
problem was, what, male blacks. And I told you at roll call, and I have no problem telling 
you this: male blacks, 14 to 20, 21.” 
63 See Jeff Rojek, Richard Rosenfeld & Scott Decker, Policing Race: The Racial 
Stratification of Searches in Police Traffic Stops, 50 CRIMINOLOGY 993 (2012) (study of 
police and racial profiling in St. Louis); CHARLES EPP ET AL., PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE 
STOPS DEFINE RACE AND CITIZENSHIP (2014) (study of police and racial profiling in 
Kansas City). 
64 Goldstein, supra note 9; Gonnerman, supra note 59; Cooper, supra note 61; Charles 
Epp & Steven Maynard-Moody, Driving While Black, WASH. MONTHLY (Jan./Feb. 2014), 
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/january_february_2014/ten_miles_square
/driving_while_black048283.php?page=all. 
65 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980). 
66 Id. at 549. 
67 Id. at 560 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgement); id. at 571 
(White, J., dissenting). 
68 Id. at 559–60. 
69 See id. at 567–68 (White, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Government sought to justify the 
stop by arguing that Ms. Mendenhall’s behavior had given rise to reasonable suspicion 
because it was consistent with portions of the so-called ‘drug-courier profile’ an informal 
amalgam of characteristics thought to be associated with persons carrying illegal 
drugs.”). 
70 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980). 
71 Id. at 572. 
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Terry72 in observing that “[w]hat the agents observed Ms. Mendenhall do 
in the airport was not ‘unusual conduct’ that would lead an experienced 
officer reasonably to conclude that criminal activity was afoot, . . .  but 
rather the kind of behavior that could reasonably be expected of anyone 
changing planes in an airport terminal.”73 
Indeed, several facts that the officers regarded as “suspicious,” such 
as the fact that she was changing airlines and carried no luggage, should 
have been free from any inferences of suspicion when officers quickly 
learned that this was an interim stop so that any luggage would have 
been transferred between planes by airline baggage handlers and ticketed 
through to her final destination.74 
The Mendenhall decision effectively invited officers to stop 
individuals in circumstances that did not provide the factual basis 
required for stopping people in Terry v. Ohio.75  In addition, the 
Mendenhall opinion explicitly expressed the presumption that people 
know that they are free to walk away from police officers,76 even though 
officers do not inform them about their rights in Fourth Amendment 
contexts.77  This convenient bit of fiction, namely that people know they 
can walk away from police officers and decline requests to answer 
questions and consent to searches,78 contributed to the dilution of Fourth 
Amendment protections, including those in Terry that focused on an 
affirmative obligation of police to have specific observations in order to 
justify a stop.79  By diminishing the recognition of and emphasis on stops 
                                                                                                             
72 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
73 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 572 (White, J., dissenting). 
74 Id. at 573. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 554. 
77 See Robinette v. Ohio, 519 U.S. 33 (1996) (officer at a traffic stop who requests 
permission to search a car does not need to inform the driver of his right to say “no”). 
78 See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 47–48 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Ohio 
Supreme Court was surely correct in stating: “Most people believe that they are validly in 
a police officer’s custody as long as the officer continues to interrogate them. The police 
officer retains the upper hand and the accoutrements of authority. That the officer lacks 
legal license to continue to detain them is unknown to most citizens, and a reasonable 
person would not feel free to walk away as the officer continues to address him.” 73 Ohio 
St. 3d, at 655, 653 N.E.2d, at 698 . . . . The fact that this particular officer successfully 
used a similar method of obtaining consent to search roughly 786 times in one 
year, State v. Retherford, 93 Ohio App. 3d 586, 591592, 639 N.E.2d 498, 502, dism’d, 69 
Ohio St. 3d 1488, 635 N.E.2d 43 (1994), indicates that motorists generally respond in a 
manner that is contrary to their self-interest. Repeated decisions by ordinary citizens to 
surrender that interest cannot satisfactorily be explained on any hypothesis other than an 
assumption that they believed they had a legal duty to do so.”) 
79 See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
64 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:53 
 
that constitute Fourth Amendment “seizures,”80 the Court moved away 
from the Terry approach of highlighting the requirements that officers 
must fulfill before intruding on the liberty of individuals.81  Instead, the 
language of the Supreme Court increasingly emphasized officers’ 
freedom to approach and question individuals without any basis in 
suspicion,82 notwithstanding citizens’ evident actual lack of knowledge 
about their Fourth Amendment rights.83 
In Illinois v. Wardlow,84 the Supreme Court majority said that 
officers’ claim that an individual ran at the sight of police in a “high 
crime” area could provide a critical fact for forming the necessary 
reasonable suspicion for a stop-and-frisk search.85 Yet, the majority 
opinion ignored the fact that police officers could not know for certain 
that the individual was running away from the sight of police officers 
since the officers claimed that they could not even remember whether 
they were driving down the street in an unmarked car or a clearly-
identifiable, marked police cruiser.86  Moreover, the majority’s 
assumption that running is suspicious behavior broadens police authority 
without acknowledging the many innocent reasons that someone may 
move quickly at any given moment.87  In addition, notwithstanding the 
                                                                                                             
80 The expressed support for broad, flexible discretionary police authority to intrude on 
citizens’ liberty in order to stop them with inquiries and questions, including those that 
might lead to a search, was premised on the unproven assumption that citizens’ know that 
they can ignore and walk away from police officer blocking their path and posing 
questions to them. See generally, Mendenhall v. United States, 446 U.S. at 554. (defining 
Fourth Amendment “seizures” quite narrowly). 
81 See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
82 See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555 (“The events took place in the public concourse. 
The agents wore no uniforms, and displayed no weapons. They did not summon the 
respondent to their presence, but instead approached her and identified themselves as 
federal agents. They requested, but did not demand, to see the respondent’s identification 
and ticket. Such conduct, without more, did not amount to an intrusion upon any 
constitutionally protected interest.”); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435-38 (1991) 
(“Bostick maintains that a reasonable bus passenger would not have felt free to leave 
under the circumstances of this case because there is nowhere to go on a bus. Also, the 
bus was about to depart. Had Bostick disembarked, he would have risked being stranded 
and losing whatever baggage he had locked away in the luggage compartment . . . . [T]he 
mere fact that Bostick did not feel free to leave the bus does not mean that the police 
seized him . . . . Our Fourth Amendment inquiry in this ease -- whether a reasonable 
person would have felt free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the 
encounter -- applies equally to police encounters that take place on trains, planes, and city 
streets.”). 
83 See supra note 78. 
84 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 (2000). 
85 Id. at 125. 
86 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 138 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
87 See id. at 128–29, 131 (Stevens, J., dissenting): (“A pedestrian may break into a run 
for a variety of reasons-to catch up with a friend a block or two away, to seek shelter 
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decision’s focus on the suspiciousness of “unprovoked” flight from the 
police, the majority appeared to accept that police officers, through their 
own behavior, could create the reasonable suspicion that they may desire 
by targeting individuals for investigative attention in order to see if the 
individuals might run.88 
In other examples of the Supreme Court’s endorsement of expansive 
discretionary law enforcement authority to intrude on the liberty of 
individuals, the Court approved a traffic stop of a minivan traveling 
down a back country road, in part, because children in the van were 
waving at the officer in what he regarded as a “mechanical” fashion.89  
The Court’s opinion conceded that the conduct of the driver and 
passengers could be entirely innocent,90 yet was willing to defer to the 
officer’s totality-of-circumstances conclusion that reasonable suspicion 
existed despite any articulable facts that pointed specifically to illegal 
conduct.91  The Court also approved officers’ authority to order 
passengers out of vehicles during traffic stops without any basis for 
suspicion that they had engaged in wrongful conduct.92  This decision led 
Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Anthony Kennedy, to 
complain that “the Court takes the unprecedented step of authorizing 
seizures that are unsupported by any individualized suspicion 
whatsoever.”93 When the Court empowered police officers to decide for 
themselves whether probable cause existed to search closed containers 
within automobiles, Justice Stevens issued a sharp criticism: “It is too 
early to know how much freedom America has lost today.  The 
magnitude of the loss is, however, not nearly as significant as the Court’s 
                                                                                                             
from an impending storm, to arrive at a bus stop before the bus leaves, to get home in 
time for dinner, to resume jogging after a pause for rest, to avoid contact with a bore or a 
bully, or simply to answer the call of nature-any of which might coincide with the arrival 
of an officer in the vicinity [In addition,] a reasonable person may conclude that an 
officer’s sudden appearance indicates nearby criminal activity. And where there is 
criminal activity there is also a substantial element of danger-either from the criminal or 
from a confrontation between the criminal and the police. These considerations can lead 
to an innocent and understandable desire to quit the vicinity with all speed.”). 
88 See id. at 130 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Nowhere in Illinois’ briefs does it specify 
what it means by ‘unprovoked.’ At oral argument, Illinois explained that if officers 
precipitate a flight by threats of violence, that flight is ‘provoked.’ But if police officers 
in a patrol car-with lights flashing and siren sounding-descend upon an individual for the 
sole purpose of seeing if he or she will run, the ensuing flight is ‘unprovoked.’”). 
89 United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415 (1997). 
93 Id. at 422 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
66 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:53 
 
willingness to inflict it without even a colorable basis for its rejection of 
prior law.”94 
In addition, the Court also approved the stop of a vehicle based on an 
anonymous tip95 even when officers following the vehicle did not 
personally observe any suspicious conduct or traffic violations.96  In 
another decision, the Roberts Court supported the permissibility of a 
vehicle stop even when the officer wrongly believed that his state’s law 
had been violated by the vehicle’s equipment.97  In effect, it was a stop 
that was not based on any legal reason, 98 leading one commentator to 
quip that “ignorance of the law is no excuse for breaking the law—unless 
you’re a police officer.”99  The cumulative effect of such decisions 
affecting pedestrians and drivers led Professor David Rudovsky to 
observe that “the power of police stop and frisk has greatly expanded and 
now encompasses all suspected criminal activity, no matter how trivial, 
and under circumstances where the conduct observed may be fully 
consistent with innocence.”100 
B.  Insufficient Recognition of the Problems of Racial 
Discrimination 
The Supreme Court’s decisions have made it difficult to prove the 
existence of racial discrimination in the decisions of criminal justice 
officials.101  For example, in McCleskey v. Kemp,102 the Court rejected an 
equal protection challenge to the death penalty system in Georgia based 
on strong statistical evidence indicating the existence of racial 
discrimination.103  Justice Lewis Powell’s majority opinion said statistics 
cannot be used to prove the existence of racial discrimination for capital 
                                                                                                             
94 California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 602 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
95 Prado Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014). 
96 Id. at 1692 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
97 Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014). 
98 Mark Joseph Stern, The Ferguson Effect, SLATE (April 21, 2015), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2015/04/rodriguez_v_unit
ed_states_a_huge_win_against_police_overreach_at_the_supreme.html. 
99 Id. 
100 David Rudovsky, Stop-and-Frisk: The Power of Data and the Decision in Floyd v. 
City of New York, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 117, 118 (2013). 
101 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (studies showing statistically 
significant racial disparities in the application of the death penalty cannot be used to 
prove the existence of racial discrimination in a state’s capital cases); See also United 
States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (holding that anecdotal evidence of disparate 
treatment by race in criminal prosecutions is insufficient to justify existing evidence to 
determine whether racial discrimination exists). 
102 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 279. 
103 Id. at 292. 
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prosecutions104 even though such evidence is accepted for proving racial 
discrimination in the presumably less-important, non-life-and-death 
contexts of jury selection and employment discrimination.105  Justice 
Powell justified the rejection of using statistics to prove discrimination in 
criminal justice by the asserted need to preserve broad discretionary 
authority for officials’ decisions in the context of criminal justice.106  As 
Justice Stevens noted in his dissent, members of the majority seemed 
more concerned with preserving capital punishment and discretionary 
decision-making than with stamping out equal protection violations in 
the criminal justice system.107  Despite widely-recognized research 
establishing the existence of racial bias in decision-making,108 the 
Court’s decision seemed to preclude any finding of an equal protection 
violation in the context of criminal justice, no matter how glaring the 
racial disparities in treatment and outcomes, except in the unlikely event 
that “decision makers openly express their biases.”109  Thus, the majority 
opinion “facilitated an expansion in discretion and concomitant 
discrimination in applying capital punishment.”110 
A further limitation on proving the existence of racial discrimination 
came from United States v. Armstrong.111  Defense attorneys brought 
forth anecdotal information about a federal prosecutor’s office that 
apparently only prosecuted minority group members and never whites 
for crack cocaine crimes despite whites’ use of the drug within that 
jurisdiction.112  The attorneys sought access to records that would enable 
them to learn whether this anecdotal information indicated the existence 
of improper racial discrimination by the prosecutor’s office.113  However, 
the Court barred access to the prosecutor’s records that would have 
provided a basis for discovering whether discrimination occurred.114  
Instead of treating racial discrimination in criminal prosecution as a 
scourge that must be eradicated at every opportunity, the majority 
                                                                                                             
104 Id. at 292–93 (“[T]o prevail under the Equal Protection Clause, McCleskey must 
prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose. He offers no 
evidence specific to his own case that would support an inference that racial 
considerations played a part in his sentence.”). 
105 Id. at 293–94. 
106 Smith, supra note 32, at 76–78. 
107 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 367 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
108 See Christopher E. Smith, The Supreme Court and Ethnicity, 69 OR. L. REV. 797, 
830 (1990). 
109 Id. 
110 Smith, supra note 32, at 76. 
111 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996). 
112 Id. at 460–61. 
113 Id. at 459. 
114 Id. at 470. 
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maintained difficult-to-establish standards for pursuing selective 
prosecution claims.115  In his dissent, Justice Stevens pointed to the 
demonstrated differential impact of sentencing for crack cocaine 
convictions as opposed to powder cocaine convictions,116 with severe 
consequences for African American defendants who predominated 
among those given long prison sentences for crack cocaine offenses.117  
Justice Stevens argued that it was proper for judges to open examinations 
of racially-discriminatory selective prosecutions because “Evidence 
tending to prove that black defendants charged with distribution of 
crack . . . are prosecuted in federal court, whereas members of other 
races charged with similar offenses are prosecuted in state court, 
warrants close scrutiny by the federal judges in that District.”118 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in McCleskey and Armstrong raise 
fears that a critical mass of justices may share Justice Scalia’s view that 
racial discrimination is an “ineradicable” problem in the criminal justice 
system and therefore, the Court should not bother with trying to address 
it.119  Justice Scalia revealed his viewpoint in an internal memorandum to 
the other justices during the Court’s consideration of the McCleskey case, 
a memorandum that became public when a professor discovered it after 
Justice Thurgood Marshall’s papers were made available at the Library 
of Congress after his death in 1993.120  In Scalia’s words, “Since it is my 
view that the unconscious operation of irrational sympathies and 
antipathies, including racial, upon jury decisions and (hence) 
prosecutorial [ones] is real, acknowledged by the [cases] of this court and 
ineradicable, I cannot honestly say that all I need is more proof [of 
discrimination].”121  Justice Scalia’s subsequent vote with the McCleskey 
majority to reject the use of powerful statistical evidence for proving the 
existence of equal protection violations led one commentator to observe 
that Scalia’s memorandum “trivialize[ed] [discriminatory practices] by 
                                                                                                             
115 Id. at 463–69. 
116 Id. at 478–80 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
117 See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE 
OF COLORBLINDNESS 112–19, 188 (2010) (racial discrimination and adverse consequences 
for African American defendants and offenders in the criminal justice system, including 
severe impact of differential sentencing for cocaine offenses). 
118 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 480 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
119 Smith, supra note 32, at 79–80. 
120 See Dennis Dorin, Far Right of the Mainstream: Racism, Rights, and Remedies from 
the Perspective of Justice Antonin Scalia’s McCleskey Memorandum, 45 MERCER L. REV. 
1035 (1994) (discussion of the discovery, content, and implications of Justice Scalia’s 
memorandum). 
121 SMITH, supra note 32, at 80. 
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saying, in a single-paragraph, that they were merely an unavoidable and 
legally unassailable, part of life for African-Americans.”122 
In his opinion, concurring in part, and dissenting in part in Illinois v. 
Wardlow,123 concerning stop-and-frisk searches, Justice Stevens pointed 
his colleagues to the real-world experiences of African Americans who 
encounter police officers.124  The majority concluded that when the 
police see someone run as officers drive down a street,  such behavior 
can be considered an important element of reasonable suspicion to justify 
a stop-and-frisk search.125 Justice Stevens, by contrast, noted that 
“[a]mong some citizens, particularly minorities and those residing in 
high crime areas, there is also the possibility that the fleeing person is 
entirely innocent, but, with or without justification, believes that contact 
with the police can itself be dangerous, apart from any criminal activity 
associated with the officer’s sudden presence.”126  Justice Stevens also 
cited various surveys about African Americans’ perceptions of 
discrimination by police as well as officers’ own admissions about the 
potential existence of bias.127  In a footnote, Stevens expressed concern 
about the need to “account for the experiences of many citizens of this 
country, particularly those who are minorities” in evaluating encounters 
between individuals and police.128  In light of his other words and 
footnotes, he clearly did not believe that his colleagues in the majority 
had adequately understood and accounted for the experiences of minority 
group members.129  Thus, racially-discriminatory behavior can be 
practiced by the police in stopping individuals and, “[s]o long as officers 
refrain from uttering racial epithets and so long as they show the good 
sense not to say ‘the only reason I stopped him was ‘cause he’s black,’ 
courts generally turn a blind eye to patterns of discrimination by the 
police.”130 
Decades ago, the Supreme Court presented a powerful, widely-
recognized voice against racial discrimination with its pronouncements 
concerning impermissible racial segregation and discrimination in 
American society131 as well as in criminal justice processes.132  
                                                                                                             
122 Dorin, supra note 120, at 1077. 
123 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000). 
124 See id. at 132 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
125 See id. at 124. 
126 Id. at 132 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
127 Id. at 132–33 nn.7–9. 
128 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 129 n.3 (2000). 
129 See id. 
130 ALEXANDER, supra note 117, at 133. 
131 See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (interpretation of statute to 
prohibit racial discrimination by certain private schools); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 
U.S. 294 (1964) (endorsement of congressional power to prohibit racial discrimination by 
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Arguably, the Supreme Court was the most visible “public actor clothed 
with the appearance of legitimacy, neutrality, and principle to . . .  
advance equality.”133  Today, there is a question as to whether police 
officers and other justice system officials have any reason to perceive the 
Supreme Court as communicating strong concerns about racial 
discrimination against African Americans and other minorities.134  
Indeed, Professor Michelle Alexander argues that “[b]ecause the 
Supreme Court has authorized the police to use race as a factor when 
making decisions regarding whom to stop and search, police departments 
believe that racial profiling exists only when race is the sole factor” 
(emphasis in original).135  As a result, rather than receive a message 
about the need to take care to avoid race-based, discriminatory decision 
making, police officers have instead perceived the Court to say that “if 
race is one factor [in a stop and search] but not the only factor, then it 
doesn’t really count as a factor at all.”136  Yet, as Professor Alexander 
observes, “[t]he problem is that although race is rarely the sole reason for 
a stop and search, it is frequently a determinative reason” (emphasis in 
original).137 
The most prominent messages presented by the contemporary 
Supreme Court majority imply that racial discrimination in American 
society is primarily a problem of the past and that heightened sensitivity 
and remedial measures are no longer needed.138  When the Supreme 
Court majority blocked recent school integration measures in Seattle and 
                                                                                                             
certain private businesses); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (unconstitutionality of 
racial segregation in federally-administered public schools due to the Fifth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) 
(unconstitutionality of racial segregation in states’ public schools due to the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause). 
132 See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (approval of hiring requirements 
to remedy racial discrimination in employment by a police agency); Lee v. Washington, 
390 U.S. 333 (1968) (prohibition on Alabama’s use of racial segregation in correctional 
institutions). 
133 Smith, supra note 108, at 844. 
134 See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 117, at 131 (“The [Supreme] Court’s quiet 
blessing of race-based traffic stops has led to something of an Orwellian public discourse 
regarding racial profiling.”). 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 See STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, MORE ESSENTIAL THAN EVER: THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 34 (2012) (“Others, including some current 
members of the Supreme Court, see anxiety about [police] discretion and worries about 
racially biased policing as products of a distinctive period in our history; they argue that 
these concerns have been rendered obsolete by progress in race relations.”). 
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Louisville, 139 Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion pointed directly to the 
contrast between the Court’s prior role in providing guidance on 
counteracting discrimination and the contemporary change in a contrary 
direction: “Yesterday, the citizens of this nation could look for guidance 
to this Court’s unanimous pronouncements concerning desegregation.  
Today, they cannot.  Yesterday, school boards had available to them a 
full range of means to combat segregated schools.  Today, they do 
not.”140 
A separate dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens underscored the 
change in the Court’s position and role on matters of race by saying, 
“The Court has changed significantly since . . . 1968.  It was then more 
faithful to Brown . . .  It is my firm conviction that no member of the 
Court that joined in 1975 would have agreed with today’s decision.”141  
Other decisions by the contemporary Court, such as proactively reducing 
the impact of the Voting Rights Act’s protections against 
discrimination142 and raising impediments for people wishing to file 
employment discrimination claims,143 have similarly reduced its image 
as an institution committed to counteracting racial discrimination.144  
Thus, the contemporary Court majority is susceptible to the same 
criticism that Justice Harry Blackmun applied to his colleagues after the 
Court’s major shift toward conservatism in the 1970s and 1980s: “One 
wonders whether the majority still believes that race discrimination—or, 
more accurately, race discrimination against non-whites—is a problem in 
our society, or even remembers that it ever was.”145 
C. Shift in Perspective to De-Emphasize Remedies for Rights 
Violations 
The changes in the Supreme Court’s composition after the rights-
protective Warren Court era contributed to expansions in police authority 
that invite suspicionless stops and race-based assertions of police 
                                                                                                             
139 Parents Involved in Community Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 
(2007). 
140 See id. at 865 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
141 See id. at 803 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
142 Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013). 
143 Vance v. Ball St. Univ,, 133 S.Ct. 2434 (2013). 
144 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Invalidates Key Part of Voting Rights Act, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2013) (Prior to striking down Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act in 
2013, “[t]he Supreme Court had repeatedly upheld the law in earlier decisions, saying 
that the preclearance requirement was an effective tool to combat the legacy of lawless 
conduct by Southern officials bent on denying voting rights to blacks.”), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/us/supreme-court-ruling.html. 
145 Ward’s Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 662 (1989) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
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power.146  In particular, the Court majority evinced a shift in perspective 
from focusing on preventing and remedying rights violations during the 
Warren Court147 era to focusing on whether police did anything 
wrong.148  The new perspective in the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts 
Court eras forgives officers for good faith errors, creates exceptions to 
previously-established rules, and thereby fails to remedy rights 
violations.149 
For example, when police conduct unjustified searches in reliance on 
judges’ errors in issuing warrants,150 errors in police databases,151 errors 
in court databases,152 and misperceptions about whether an individual has 
actual authority to consent to a search of a residence,153 officials are 
allowed to use incriminating evidence found in those searches despite 
violations of Fourth Amendment rights.154  Under the perspective driving 
decisions since the end of the Warren Court era, the question of 
providing remedies for rights violations “turns on the culpability of the 
police,”155 not on the question of whether rights violations occurred.156  
Such rulings may decrease incentives for police to gather as much 
information as possible since they can gain the benefit of broadened 
search authority by claiming ignorance of all relevant facts and therefore 
use self-interested ignorance to avoid culpability for rights violations.157  
                                                                                                             
146 See Smith, supra note 32, at 6–29. 
147 Id. at 12, 36. 
148 SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 41, at 102. 
149 Id. at 102–107. In the Burger Court era, see, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 
897 (1984) (holding that officers could use evidence from an improper search based on a 
warrant improperly issued by a judicial officer). In the Rehnquist Court era, see, e.g., 
Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995) (holding that police officers could use incriminating 
evidence found incident to an arrest even though the arrest was based on a nonexistent 
warrant erroneously recorded in a court database). In the Roberts Court era, see, e.g., 
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (holding that police officers could use 
incriminating evidence found incident to an arrest even though the arrest was based on a 
nonexistent warrant erroneously recorded in a law enforcement database). 
150 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
151 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009). 
152 Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995). 
153 Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990). 
154 See SMITH, supra note 41, at 98, 102, 105. 
155 Herring, 555 U.S. at 135. 
156 See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (holding that a Fourth 
Amendment violation occurred when a search warrant was issued based on stale 
information that could not constitute probable cause, but the evidence found during the 
improper search could be used to prosecute the defendant because a judicial officer rather 
than the police was responsible for the error.). 
157 See id. at 955 (Brennan, J., dissenting). (“If evidence is consistently excluded in 
these circumstances, police departments will surely be prompted to instruct their officers 
to devote greater care and attention to providing sufficient information to establish 
probable cause when applying for a warrant, and to review with some attention the form 
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This emphasis on overlooking police errors that lead to intrusions on 
individuals’ liberty recently expanded even further with the Court’s 2014 
decision in Heien v. North Carolina permitting traffic stops that may lead 
to a search to be based on an officer’s erroneous assumption about 
possessing the authority to enforce a nonexistent statute.158 
The creation of exceptions to the Warren Court’s rights-protective 
rulings159 and the recognition of increasing numbers of situations for 
which the Supreme Court approves warrantless searches160 expanded 
police discretionary authority and contributed to the risk of abuses.161  
Moreover, by providing a variety of avenues for after-the-fact 
manufactured narratives to rationalize unjustified stops, searches and 
decisions to use force,162  Supreme Court decisions enable dishonest 
police officers to hide from judicial scrutiny their knowingly improper 
and race-based discretionary intrusions on individuals’ liberties.163 
                                                                                                             
of the warrant that they have been issued, rather than automatically assuming that 
whatever document the magistrate has signed will necessarily comport with Fourth 
Amendment requirements. After today’s decisions, however, that institutional incentive 
will be lost. Indeed, the Court’s ‘reasonable mistake’ exception to the exclusionary rule 
will tend to put a premium on police ignorance of the law.”). 
158 Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S.Ct. 530 (2014). 
159 See CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 
AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 26 (4th ed. 2000) (“Most important in this regard 
has been the Court’s inexorable movement toward the position that the exclusionary rule 
should not apply when police are ‘reasonably’ unaware they are violating Fourth 
Amendment principles . . . .”). See also HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 34, at 448 
(“However, the landmark precedent [Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 644 (1961)] had begun to 
experience a ‘swiss cheese’ effect as the Burger Court created exceptions that 
increasingly permitted improperly obtain evidence to be used against criminal 
defendants.”). 
160 Categories of permissible warrantless searches resting on police discretion rather the 
approval of a judicial officer include stop-and-frisk, exigent circumstances, incident to an 
arrest, and various scenarios involving automobiles. SMITH, supra note 41, at 100–107. 
161 New York City’s widespread stop-and-frisk practices targeting young minority men 
for hundreds of thousands of suspicionless stops represent the kind of abuse that can 
follow from widening opportunities for discretionary, warrantless searches. See supra 
notes 56–64 and accompanying text. 
162 See, e.g., WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 159, at 46 (“The elasticity of the 
majority’s standard [for the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule] 
creates significant potential for . . . at worst encouraging police to take illegal shortcuts in 
the belief that legal investigatory methods can be imagined by the time of the suppression 
hearing.”). 
163 For example, police officers who have found incriminating evidence during an 
improper search have a period time from the search or arrest until preliminary hearings in 
court to create a description of a situation or event that may, for example, let them claim 
that they had sufficient reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop-and-frisk search or that 
exigent circumstances required them to take immediate action—whether or not that 
actual description is true. See Benjamin Weiser, Police in Gun Searches Face Disbelief in 
Court, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2008) at B1. 
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An additional aspect of deficiencies in the Supreme Court’s 
protection of rights can be seen in rulings that make it difficult to hold 
criminal justice officials accountable for possible rights violations.  In 
Scott v. Harris,164 for example, based on the justices’ own subjective 
interpretation of a police-car video of the chase, the Supreme Court ruled 
that a fleeing speeder who was permanently disabled when his car was 
intentionally rammed by a police cruiser at high speed could not proceed 
to trial in his lawsuit against the police.165  In his dissent, Justice Stevens 
criticized the majority for usurping the role of a jury by making a fact-
finding determination in a case for which the police arguably did not 
need to give chase and cause the victim to flee because the police had the 
speeder’s license plate number and could simply have gone to his home 
to ticket or arrest him.166  The Supreme Court took the same approach in 
a subsequent case in which police officers fired fifteen bullets into a 
vehicle, killing both the driver and a passenger, after the driver sped 
away from a traffic stop.167  In both cases, the Court denied any 
opportunity for the police liability claims to go to trial even though lower 
courts had ordered that the claims be presented to juries.168  In such use-
of-force cases, other avenues of accountability can be blocked by police 
departments’ relationships with prosecutors when prosecutors use their 
discretionary authority to decline to pursue criminal charges against 
officers, even in troubling cases that result in the deaths of innocent 
individuals under questionable circumstances.169  Prosecutors can also 
orchestrate the grand jury proceedings to protect police officers from 
prosecution.170 
In another example concerning accountability through civil liability, 
the Roberts Court strengthened prosecutorial immunity, even under 
shocking circumstances, by overturning a $14 million jury verdict won 
                                                                                                             
164 Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007). 
165 Id. at 384–86. 
166 Id. at 389–97 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
167 Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S.Ct. 2012 (2014). 
168 Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. at 372 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Plumhoff, 132 S. Ct. at 
2012. See Adam Liptak, Justices Unite on Key Point in Chase Ending in Fatal Police 
Shooting, N.Y. TIMES (Mar 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/05/us/justices-
seem-united-on-key-argument-in-fatal-police-chase.html. 
169 See, e.g., Tony Pipitone, Miami-Dade Police Launch Criminal Investigation Into 
Missing Evidence; No Discipline for Officers in Redland Killings, NBC MIAMI (Mar. 21, 
2015), http://www.nbcmiami.com/news/local/Miami-Dade-Police-Launch-Criminal-In 
vestigation-Into-Missing-Evidence-No-Discipline-for-Officers-in-Redland-Killings-
297080891.html (prosecutors decline to prosecute police officers for shooting police 
informant and three burglars under circumstances in which video evidence showed a 
victim raise his hands to surrender and none of the victims had a rifle as reported by 
police). 
170 See supra note 12, and accompanying text. 
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by a man who spent many years on death row due to prosecutorial 
misconduct involving hiding and destroying exculpatory evidence.171  
Police typically work closely with prosecutors and may be involved in 
hiding or distorting evidence that might have cast doubt on a particular 
defendant’s guilt.172  According to the Supreme Court, “the individual 
prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the 
others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the 
police.”173  Because it is prosecutors rather than police who are supposed 
to have obligations under Brady v. Maryland 174for sharing exculpatory 
evidence with defense attorneys, prosecutorial responsibility and 
immunity may effectively shield police, as when claims are directed at 
immunity-protected prosecutors for information never revealed by 
police.175 
In addition, the Supreme Court has further contributed to criminal 
justices officials’ avoidance of accountability and consequences in 
certain situations, such as the failure to preserve evidence that might be 
favorable to the defendant, by requiring the defendant to prove “bad 
faith” on the part of police in order to prove a rights violation.176  The 
Court’s failure to make police responsible for preserving evidence led, 
for example, to a Denver Post investigation that found 141 cases in 
which Colorado police and prosecutors destroyed evidence that 
convicted offenders sought to have tested.177  In one Colorado case, in 
violation of their own department’s policies and a court order, police 
tossed into a dumpster DNA evidence labeled “DO NOT DESTROY” 
                                                                                                             
171 Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350 (2011). 
172 See, e.g., Joaquin Sapien, Watching the Detectives: Will Probe of Cop’s Cases 
Extend to Prosecutors?, PRO PUBLICA (June 21, 2013, 9:52 AM) 
http://www.propublica.org/ 
article/watching-the-detectives-will-probe-of-cops-cases-extend-to-prosecutors 
(Brooklyn detective worked closely with prosecutors for many years before having 
several murder convictions reexamined and overturned after defendants had served years 
in prison). 
173 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995). 
174 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
175 See, e.g., Robert S. Mahler, Extracting the Gate Key: Litigating Brady Issues, NATL. 
ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS (May 2001) at n.3, http://www.nacdl.org/Champion 
.aspx?id=22712 (“Professor Rosen’s article . . . had no occasion to address the times 
when exculpatory information in possession of law enforcement agencies was never 
disclosed to either the defense or the prosecutor . . . “). 
176 Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988). 
177 Susan Greene & Miles Moffeit, Bad Faith Difficult to Prove: Through Carelessness 
or by Design, Tiny Biological Samples Holding Crucial DNA Fingerprints Often 
Disappear on Authorities’ Watch. Innocent People Languish in Prison, and Criminals 
Walk Free, DENVER POST (July 22, 2007), http://www.denverpost.com/evidence/ci_ 
6429277. 
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and thereby stopped a prisoner from seeking to prove his innocence.178  
Nationally-known criminal defense attorney Abe Hutt said about his 
client in that case: 
You don’t scream about your innocence from a jail cell 
for 10 years and finally get the money together to have 
this stuff tested only to have so many people at the 
police department be careless, negligent, bad faith, 
reckless, whatever you want to call it, and thereby 
destroy forever your ability to prove your innocence and 
then have a court look at you and say, well, tough, that’s 
kind of the way it goes.179 
The issue of holding police responsible for preserving evidence may 
seem distant from the post-Ferguson debates about excessive use of 
force, improper stops and searches, and race-based discriminatory 
decisions by police.180  Yet, in reality, this issue provides further 
evidence that the Supreme Court’s decisions may have facilitated, and 
perhaps even encouraged, police officers and other criminal justice 
officials to freely act with impunity in the absence of any fear of 
accountability and adverse consequences.181 
III.  CONCLUSION 
It is unquestionably true that seeking to prevent and remedy the 
wrongs evident in the pervasive problem of unjustified police stops, 
searches, and uses of force against African American men in every strata 
of society182 will require action by officials throughout the justice 
                                                                                                             
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
180 Issues about evidence preservation arise during or after criminal prosecutions while 
debates about the Ferguson, Missouri, shooting of Michael Brown and other controversial 
police use-of-force incidents against unarmed African Americans concern police 
encounters prior to prosecution. See supra notes 1–11, and accompanying text. 
181 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, MADHAVI MCCALL, & CYNTHIA PEREZ 
MCCLUSKEY, LAW AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: EMERGING ISSUES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 32–33 (2005) (“Because of the [Supreme] Court’s reputation for conservatism 
and consistent record of generally endorsing expanded governmental powers in criminal 
justice, police officers, prosecutors, corrections officials, and lower court judges may feel 
encouraged to push and test the limitations created by prior precedents. Their 
observations and experiences may indicate to them that the Rehnquist Court is likely to 
eliminate, diminish, or create exceptions to rights-enforcing rules established in prior 
Supreme Court decisions.”). 
182 Racially discriminatory actions by police officers do not merely affect the politically 
powerless people in poor communities such as Ferguson, Mo. Such actions are an ever- 
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system.183  Moreover, progress will require the cultivation of greater 
tolerance, self-awareness, and honesty within future police officers 
among American young people through lifelong developmental 
processes affected by school systems, news media, and other broad 
societal influences.184  The U.S. Supreme Court also has a role to play in 
addressing the problems that are at the forefront of public consciousness 
following the events in Ferguson, Missouri, and elsewhere in reaction to 
police violence.185  The Court played a key role in facilitating recent 
injustices and tragedies186 and, although it cannot cure pervasive 
                                                                                                             
present fact of life for African American graduates of Harvard and other elites. See 
Christopher E. Smith, What I Learned About Stop-and-Frisk from Watching My Black 
Son, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 1, 2014), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/04/what-i-learned-about-stop-and-
frisk-from-watching-my-black-son/359962/ (describing Harvard student’s experience 
when targeted by New York City stop-and-frisk practices); See also, Byronn Bain, 
Walking While Black: The Bill of Rights for Black Men, THE VILLAGE VOICE (Apr. 25, 
2000), http://www.villagevoice.com/2000-04-25/news/walking-while-black (detailing 
unjust arrest of a Harvard Law School student walking down the sidewalk in New York 
City). 
183 For example, essential elements of reform must include closer supervision and 
skepticism by trial judges who evaluate police officers’ rationalizations for their actions. 
Weiser, supra note 162. Reforms must also include police administrators’ allocation of 
resources for purchasing and monitoring effective body camera systems. Stav Ziv, Study 
Finds Body Camera Reduce Police’s Use of Force, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 28, 2014, 2:31 PM) 
http://www.newsweek.com/amidst-debate-study-finds-body-cameras-decrease-polices-
use-force-295315. 
184 See, e.g., David Brandwein & Christopher Donoghue, A Multicultural Grassroots 
Effort to Reduce Ethnic & Racial Social Distance among Middle School Students, 19 
MULTICULTURAL ED. 38 (2012) (detailing study of program designed to increase racial 
tolerance among school children). 
185 For example, virtually every year the Supreme Court considers and issues decisions 
on Fourth Amendment issues that inform law enforcement officials about how to train 
and supervise their officers. In the 2012–2013 Supreme Court Term, for example, the 
justices issued five widely-discussed decisions concerning the Fourth Amendment: 
Florida v. Harris, 133 S.Ct. 1050 (2013) (rejection of challenge to drug-sniffing dog’s 
training and certification); Bailey v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 1031 (2013) (limitation on 
police authority to stop and frisk a suspect who was a distance away from where a search 
warrant was being executed at his residence); Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.Ct. 1409 (2013) 
(an officer’s intentional investigatory act of bringing a drug-sniffing dog to the front 
porch of a home was a “search” that requires a warrant or other recognized justification 
for a reasonable Fourth Amendment search); Maryland v. King, 133 S.Ct. 1958 (2013) 
(approval of DNA sample swabs involuntarily taken from arrestees under state law); 
Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013) (normally police should seek a warrant 
when they want to have blood drawn to test blood alcohol level of suspected drunk 
driver). See also, Michael A. McCall, Madhavi M. McCall & Christopher E. Smith, 
Criminal Justice and the 2012–2013 United States Supreme Court Term, 5 CHARLOTTE L. 
REV. 35 (2014) (description and analysis of U.S. Supreme Court’s criminal justice 
decisions). 
186 See supra notes 61–180, and accompanying text. 
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problems that reflect the nation’s long history of racial bias and 
discrimination,187 its symbolic voice and rule-making authority can 
contribute to aspects of needed police reforms.188 
We need a Supreme Court that is skeptical of police officers, their 
potential biases, their potential self-interested motives, and their 
honesty.189  The foregoing statement should not be construed as fulfilling 
Rudolph Giuliani’s phony political statement about President Obama in 
which Giuliani claimed that the president spread “propaganda” telling 
“everybody to hate the police.”190  It is merely a recognition that the 
nation needs to see the Court  return to James Madison’s observation in 
Federalist No. 51 that “If men were angels, no government would be 
necessary.”191  In this regard, the specific governmental need is for 
stricter judicial rulemaking, skepticism, and scrutiny regarding the 
inherently imperfect, “non-angel” human beings who are law 
enforcement officers.192  As Professor Stephen Schulhofer has explained, 
                                                                                                             
187 Even when the Supreme Court speaks strongly against racial discrimination, its 
action alone has limited impact on curing such a deeply entrenched problem. See 
ARCHIBALD COX, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 250–68 (1987) (discussion of the 
years’ long challenge of ending racial segregation in public schools even after the 
Supreme Court outlawed the practice in Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). 
188 See, e.g., CAROLYN N. LONG, MAPP V. OHIO: GUARDING AGAINST UNREASONABLE 
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES (2006) (“Despite complaining bitterly about Mapp v. Ohio, 
police, whether they like it or not, had to change their way of conducting searches . . . . 
Other jurisdictions observed how Mapp prompted the law enforcement community to 
professionalize its officers.”). 
189 See Judge Says Remarks on ‘Gorillas’ May Be Cited in Trial on Beating, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jun. 12, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/06/12/us/judge-says-remarks-on-
gorillas-may-be-cited-in-trial-on-beating.html, for an example of police officers’ self-
interested motives, and instances of dishonesty. (Reporting that the prevalence of 
recording devices regularly provides evidence of individual police officers’ biases, such 
as officers in the Rodney King beating and their radio transmission references to 
gorillas); Attorney: Officer Who Shot Man Saturday Believes He Followed Proper 
Procedure, ABC 4 NEWS (Apr. 5, 2015, 4:52 PM), 
http://www.abcnews4.com/story/28725562/coroner-identifies-man-shot-killed-by-north-
charleston-police-officer. (With respect to individual officers’ honesty, in the immediate 
aftermath of the North Charleston, South Carolina, shooting of Walter Scott, Officer 
Michael Slager claimed that Scott had taken the officer’s Taser in a struggle and implied 
that he had to shoot in self-defense.); William M. Welch, S.C. Police Officer Charged in 
Fatal Shooting, USA TODAY (Apr. 8, 2015, 2:39 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/04/07/charges-in-sc-police-shooting/2543 
0473/ (However, the video of the incident taken by on a cellphone by a bystander showed 
Scott running away with the Taser, with which he had been shot, trailing along behind 
him as Officer Slager shot him the back while firing multiple times.). 
190 Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Giuliani’s Claim that Obama Launched Anti-Police 
Propaganda, WASH. POST (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-
checker/wp/2014/12/23/giulianis-claim-that-obama-launched-anti-police-propaganda/. 
191 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
192 See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
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a key trend that facilitated the problems illustrated by the Ferguson 
shooting and other recent events concerns the commitment of the 
Supreme Court’s majority since the end of the Warren Court era to be 
overly trusting of police officers:193 
A similar inversion of Fourth Amendment values—
positing police trustworthiness and resisting judicial 
oversight—is reflected in the Court’s recent attitude 
toward remedies for a Fourth Amendment violation . . . 
On this subject as on so many others, the Court is once 
again turning our Fourth Amendment tradition and the 
commitments of the Framers inside out.  The claim that 
law enforcement can be trusted to follow the law is of 
course politically appealing, and no doubt most police 
officers are persons of goodwill and decent intentions.  
Nonetheless, the premise that such probity will persist 
without independent checks, and that executive officers 
can be trusted to exercise search-and-seizure powers 
fairly, in the absence of judicial oversight, is precisely 
the assumption that the Fourth Amendment rejects.194 
During prior eras, there were justices on the Court whose personal 
exposure to abusive police conduct taught them that police need firm, 
strong rules in order for individuals’ rights to be protected.  Justice 
Thurgood Marshall was nearly lynched by police officers in Tennessee 
when he was a roving civil rights attorney in the South prior to his 
judicial career.195  In his youth, Justice William Brennan saw his labor-
union-organizer father beaten bloody by the police.196  Looking back on 
his career as an attorney, Justice John Paul Stevens was never able to 
forget a client’s description of being brutally beaten by the Chicago 
police until he confessed to a murder that he did not commit.197  Without 
personal experiences of their own with abusive police conduct, 
contemporary justices need to look closely at the nature and number of 
controversial police incidents that emerge with unfortunate regularity as 
the means to remind themselves that it is a mistake to facilitate the risk of 
                                                                                                             
193 SCHULHOFER, supra note 138, at 66–67. 
194 Id. 
195 JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 131–32, 139–
40 (1998). 
196 KIM ISAAC EISLER, A JUSTICE FOR ALL: WILLIAM J. BRENNAN AND THE DECISIONS 
THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA 19 (1993). 
197 JOHN PAUL STEVENS, FIVE CHIEFS: A SUPREME COURT MEMOIR 79–80 (2011). 
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abuse by being too trusting of the imperfect human beings who serve as 
police officers.198 
We need a Supreme Court that seeks to understand the lives of all 
Americans, rich and poor, so that the Court’s decisions will not make 
erroneous assumptions as a means to defer to police actions.199  For 
example, why assume that someone running in a poor neighborhood is 
guiltily fleeing from the police rather than understand that the arrival of 
the police in such areas may mean that something bad is happening and 
careful citizens would be wise to leave the area?200  Why assume that 
Americans know that they can say “no” when police officers ask for 
consent to search their vehicles?201  Why assume that Americans know 
that they can say “no” when asked by police officers to accompany the 
officers to an office at the airport?202  If the Court majority is incapable 
of seeking a realistic view of people’s possible innocent motives and 
deficiencies in knowledge, there is a grave risk that the Court effectively 
abdicates its judicial role in favor of lending its authority and power to 
the effort to combat crime at the cost of constitutional rights.203 
                                                                                                             
198 See supra notes 1–15 and accompanying text. 
199 See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) (assuming that seated bus 
passengers are sufficiently aware of their rights to know that they can decline to answer 
police officers’ questions and terminate the officers’ inquiries). 
200 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 131 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“[A] reasonable person may conclude that an officer’s sudden 
appearance indicates nearby criminal activity. And where there is criminal activity there 
is also a substantial element of danger-either from the criminal or from a confrontation 
between the criminal and the police. These considerations can lead to an innocent and 
understandable desire to quit the vicinity with all speed.”). 
201 Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 48 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The fact that 
this particular officer successfully used a similar method of obtaining consent to search 
roughly 786 times in one year . . . indicates that motorists generally respond in a manner 
that is contrary to their self-interest. Repeated decisions by ordinary citizens to surrender 
that interest cannot satisfactorily be explained on any hypothesis other than an 
assumption that they believed they had a legal duty to do so.”). 
202 See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 577 (White, J., dissenting) 
(“On the record before us, the Court’s conclusion can only be based on the notion that 
consent can be assumed from the absence of proof that a suspect resisted police authority. 
This is a notion that we have squarely rejected.”). 
203 Justice Stevens was critical of the Court’s majority that granted police officers the 
authority to make their own determinations of probable to justify searches of containers 
inside automobiles. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 601 (1991) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). (“No impartial observer could criticize this Court for hindering the progress 
of the war on drugs. On the contrary, decisions like the one this Court makes today will 
support the conclusion that this Court has become a loyal foot soldier in the Executive’s 
fight against crime. Even if the warrant requirement does inconvenience the police to 
some extent, that fact does not distinguish this constitutional requirement from any other 
procedural protection secured by the Bill of Rights. It is merely a part of the price that our 
society must pay in order to preserve its freedom.”) 
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In addition, we need justices to have greater awareness of the 
continuing problems of racial discrimination and the salience of race for 
triggering adverse treatment of young men, in particular, at the hands of 
the police.204  There is plenty of empirical evidence to demonstrate this 
reality.205  Moreover, they need only listen to the words of their 
colleague Justice Sotomayor to learn about the impact of race and 
ethnicity in American society.206  They need to learn from her words and 
experience that “Race also matters because of persistent racial inequality 
in society—inequality that has produced stark socioeconomic 
disparities”207 and that their responsibility is to “apply the Constitution 
with eyes open to the unfortunate effects of centuries of racial 
discrimination.”208 
There are individual cases in which the majority of contemporary 
Roberts Court justices identify needed limitations on police officers’ 
discretionary actions involving stops and searches,209 such as the 2015 
decision in Rodriguez v. United States barring police officers from 
holding drivers after a completed traffic stop without a basis for 
reasonable suspicion.210  Such individual decisions are necessary but 
woefully insufficient as a means for the Court to play its needed role 
because police officers must see the nation’s highest court consistently 
                                                                                                             
204 See supra notes 1–15 and accompanying text. 
205 See supra notes 56–64 and accompanying text. 
206 See Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S.Ct. 1623, 1676 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Race also matters because of persistent racial inequality in 
society—inequality that cannot be ignored and that has produced stark socioeconomic 
disparities. . . . Race matters to a young man’s view of society when he spends his 
teenage years watching others tense up as he passes, no matter the neighborhood where 
he grew up. Race matters to a young woman’s sense of self when she states her 
hometown, and then is pressed, “No, where are you really from?” regardless of how 
many generations her family has been in the country . . . . Race matters because of the 
slights, the snickers, the silent judgments that reinforce that most crippling of thoughts: “I 
do not belong here.” In my colleagues’ view, examining the racial impact of legislation 
only perpetuates racial discrimination. This refusal to accept the stark reality that race 
matters is regrettable. The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to speak 
openly and candidly on the subject of race, and to apply the Constitution with eyes open 
to the unfortunate effects of centuries of racial discrimination. As members of the 
judiciary tasked with intervening to carry out the guarantee of equal protection, we ought 
not sit back and wish away, rather than confront, the racial inequality that exists in our 
society . . . “). 
207 Id. 
208 Id. 
209 See Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473 (2014) (forbidding warrantless searches of a 
driver’s cellphone based solely on the arrest of the driver); Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.Ct. 
1409 (2013) (holding that police officers who bring a drug-sniffing dog to the porch of a 
home are engaged in a search and therefore need a warrant or an appropriate warrantless 
search justification). 
210 Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015). 
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display a strong commitment to eradicating racial discrimination and 
properly limiting officers’ discretionary authority.211  Given the 
unthoughtful statements made by members of the contemporary Court’s 
conservative majority related to race,212 crime,213 and police power,214 
there is little reason for optimism about the Roberts Court’s role in the 
nation’s current post-Ferguson efforts to address glaring problems with 
police practices.215  Indeed, there is little likelihood that the Court will 
play its needed role unless and until election results for the White House 
and U.S. Senate coincide with justices’ retirements in a manner that leads 
                                                                                                             
211 The Supreme Court can have a powerful symbolic voice when, as described by 
Laurence Tribe, “the Court exert[s] the one thing it clearly can control—its rights-
declaration powers . . . .” Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: 
What Lawyers Can Learn From Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1, 30 (1989). 
212 For example, when the Supreme Court considered an issue of racial discrimination 
in jury selection, Justice Scalia pointedly criticized Justice Marshall: “Justice Marshall’s 
dissent rolls out the ultimate weapon, the accusation of insensitivity to racial 
discrimination—which will lose its intimidating effect if it continues to be fired so 
randomly.” Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 486 (1990). In one sarcastic sentence 
written on behalf of himself and four colleagues, Scalia implied that claims of racial 
discrimination are often illegitimate, used improperly in an attempt to intimidate other 
justices, thereby providing proof that “the Supreme Court must, in fact, curtail its 
attention and responsiveness to such issues.” Smith, supra note 108, at 839. 
213 For example, when a five-member majority endorsed a lower court decision 
requiring California to reduce its prison population because the system was unable to 
provide adequate medical and mental health care to prisoners in overcrowded institutions, 
thereby leading to needless deaths and physical suffering, Justice Alito issued a dire 
warning about the results of the order: “The three-judge court ordered the premature 
release of approximately 46,000 criminals—the equivalent of three Army divisions . . . . I 
fear that today’s decision, like prior prisoner release orders, will lead to a grim roster of 
victims.” Brown v. Plata, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1959, 1968 (2011). Despite Justice Alito’s 
frightening claims about the impending release of a veritable “Army” of criminals to 
inflict harm on the citizens of California, in fact, California developed a realignment plan 
to reduce prison populations by having prisoners with shorter sentences serve their time 
in county jails. In the aftermath of realign, the violent crime rate in California was at its 
lowest level in nearly 50 years. MAGNUS LOFSTROM & BRANDON MARTIN, CALIFORNIA’S 
FUTURE: CORRECTIONS, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL. (Feb. 2015), 
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_215 
MLR.pdf. 
214 For example, Justice Thomas claimed that the fact that an officer sees and smells an 
air freshener in a car can serve as a key element in forming reasonable suspicion that the 
vehicle contains drugs. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1622 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
215 One commentator speculated that “[p]erhaps the savvy, media-aware [Chief Justice] 
Roberts has finally learned the lessons of Ferguson” when he supported the individual’s 
Fourth Amendment rights in Rodriguez, Stern, supra note 98. However, the same 
commentator observed that “[w]hatever epiphany struck Roberts . . . seems to have 
missed Justice Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Alito.” Id. Even if this 
speculative comment about Roberts proves to be accurate, increased sensitivity by one 
justice alone will have little impact on the direction of the Court’s decisions. 
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to changes in the Court’s composition, and thereby positions thoughtful 
new justices to employ their skepticism of police authority in rights-
declaring decisions that strengthen constitutional protections.216 
 
 
                                                                                                             
216 As demonstrated by the protracted process for confirming President Obama’s 
nominee Loretta Lynch as U.S. Attorney General in 2015, even the election of a liberal 
Democrat as president in 2016 or subsequent elections may not lead to rights-defending 
nominees to the Supreme Court if the Senate is controlled by Republicans who are 
committed to resisting such appointments. See Jennifer Steinhauer, Senate Confirms 
Loretta Lynch as Attorney General After Long Delay, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/24/us/politics/loretta-lynch-attorney-general-
vote.html?_r=0. 
